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The issue 
• When government has to resort to tax on factor income, what 
should be the optimal tax on capital income, vs. that on labor 
income, in a macro growth context? 
 
• In the standard Ramsey-type growth models, the optimal tax 
on capital income is zero. See Judd (1985) and Chamley 
(1986), and subsequently extensions.  
 
• However, in life-cycle (overlapping generations) models, the 
growth maximizing tax policy is to set the tax rate on capital 
income as high as possible (under certain plausible conditions). 
See Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballe (1998). 
 
• The reality is neither! 
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The issue 
• In the Ramsey growth model, various extensions have 
been made to generate non-zero optimal tax on capital: 
 
– by incorporating distortions such as externalities of capital 
taxation (Barro 1990, Chen 2007) and imperfectly 
competitive product market (Guo and Lansing 1999).  
 
– by incorporating human capital accumulation in a two-sector 
growth model, where human capital is the engine of long-run 
growth (Chen and Lu 2013).  
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The issue 
• In the overlapping generations model, there are two 
opposing effects of capital taxation on growth via 
savings. 
 
– As is standard, higher capital income taxation leads to less 
savings as it lowers returns (net interest rate) on savings.  
 
– Higher capital income taxation alleviates the need for labor 
income taxation, resulting in more savings when young.  
 
– Provided that the interest elasticity of savings is sufficiently 
low, therefore, raising capital income taxation will result in 
higher savings and hence growth.  
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The issue 
• In the multi-periods life cycle models, studies have 
established that positive capital income tax can be 
optimal: 
 
– with multiple but finite periods of a life cycle and elastic 
labor-leisure choice in each period, the optimal tax policy 
necessarily involves age-dependent tax rates on labor 
income (Erosa and Gervais 2002); 
 
– when age-dependent labor income tax is not feasible, a 
positive tax rate on capital is optimal to mimic the required 
age-dependent tax structure (Conesa et al. 2009). 
6 
Our Approach 
• In this paper, we reexamine the issue of optimal factor taxation 
in a standard OLG model. 
 
• A distinguishing feature of our model is that physical capital is 
produced by risky projects that are partially financed through a 
credit market with asymmetric information between lenders 
and borrowers (in the form of the standard CSV problem). 
 
• The asymmetric information in the credit market brings 
optimal contracting into the discussion. 
 
• We show that the information friction introduces a rationale to 
lower the optimal tax rate on capital, which will no longer be 
as high as possible.  
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Main Results 
• In the truth-telling equilibrium, the monitoring probability 
increases with the tax rate on capital income. 
• The equilibrium monitoring probability also rises with the 
reliance on external financing in the credit market. 
• To the extent that monitoring is costly and hence causes credit 
market distortions, external financing exacerbates the 
information frictions. 
• The growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates on capital 
income are lower with (i) more severe asymmetric information 
friction, and (ii) greater reliance on external financing. 
• Welfare maximizing capital income tax rate is smaller than the 
growth maximizing counterpart. 
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The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
• Individuals live for 2 periods: young and old 
 
• A θ fraction of young agents is lenders and a 1-θ fraction is 
borrowers. 
 
• Agents are risk neutral, work when young and consume when 
old (thus have a zero interest elasticity of savings, which would 
imply a corner solution for the optimal tax on capital in the 
absence of any frictions) 
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• Young lenders work and provide their wages as the source of 
loans, which have alternative use via a safe storage technology 
(yields ε units of consumption per unit of input) 
 
• Young borrowers also work and seek loans to run risky 
projects which produce capital goods in next period 
 
• The returns of borrowers’ projects can take on one of two 
possible values: 0 (with prob. π) and κ (with prob. 1- π) 
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
10 
• The project realization is privately observed by its operator 
(the borrower) 
 
• Lenders can verify the project outcome via auditing, which has 
a cost of δ amount of capital (per unit of loan) 
 
• Lenders offer contract Ct = {Φt, Rt,  qt}, where Φt is the 
auditing probability, Rt is the loan rate, and qt is the loan size 
(external financing) 
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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• Government levies a tax rate τρ on capital income and a tax 
rate τw on labor income. 
 
• Two technical assumptions: 
 
  (1 – π)κ – πδ > 0 
 
 γ2A[(1 – π) κ – πδ](1 – τρ) > ε 
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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• Due to competition, lenders maximize borrowers’ expected 
payoff subject to constraints: 
 
 Max (1 – π)(1 – τρ)(κρt+1Qt – Rtqt) 
 s.t.  (κρt+1Qt – Rtqt) ≥ (1 – Φt)κρt+1Qt      (ICC) 
  (1 – τρ)[(1 –π)Rt – πΦtδρt+1]qt = εqt  (ZPC) 
  κρt+1 ≥ Rt                                           (PC) 
  qt ≤ θ(1 – τw)wt/(1- θ)           (Resource constraint) 
 
Qt = (1 – τw)wt + qt             (internal and external financing) 
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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• In the truth-telling equilibrium, the incentive compatibility 
constraint is binding. 
 
• Since the participation constraint hold in strict inequality in 
equilibrium, a borrower wants to borrow as much as possible, 
and hence the resource constraint binds. 
 
• The larger the fraction of lenders θ (relative to borrowers), the 
greater the size of external financing for each project, making 
the project more reliant on external financing. 
 
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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• Solution of the optimal contract: 
  
 Φt = Φ = ε/{γA[(1 – π)κ – θπδ] (1 – τρ)},   
 Rt = εκ/{[(1 – π)κ – θπδ] (1 – τρ)}, 
 qt = θ(1 – τw)wt/(1- θ). 
 
 We have: 0< Φ <1, ∂Φ/∂τρ > 0 and ∂Φ/∂θ > 0.  
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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• The equilibrium monitoring probability increases with the tax 
rate on capital income, because the a higher tax increases the 
incentive to “cheat”.  
 
• The equilibrium monitoring probability also increases with the 
extent of external financing, because the incentive to “cheat” 
also rises with the amount of external financing. 
 
• Since monitoring entails loss of resource (a form of 
inefficiency), our results suggest that both capital income 
taxation and reliance on external finance exacerbate the 
information distortions in the credit market. 
  
The Model: Credit Market Equil. 
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Optimal Taxation –  
Growth Maximizing Case 
• Solve it for the growth maximizing capital income tax rate: 
 
 ∂ln(g)/∂τρ = 0  
 
 
  
 
 We have:  
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Optimal Taxation –  
Growth Maximizing Case 
• The auditing probability under the optimal tax policy of τρ* is: 
  
 
  
 
 Note that Φ* is 
 
 (i) increasing with θ: ∂Φ*/∂θ > 0; 
 (ii) U-shaped and non-monotonic in δ: 
  ∂Φ*/∂δ < 0 when 0 < δ < (1 – π)κ/2θπ 
  ∂Φ*/∂δ > 0 when (1 – π)κ/2θπ < δ < (1 – π)κ/θπ  
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Optimal Taxation –  
Growth Maximizing Case 
 
• The optimal growth rate is: 
 
 
 
 Note that:  
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Optimal Taxation –  
Welfare Maximizing Case 
• The welfare of all generations can be expressed by: 
 
 
     where       denotes the total payoffs to all (old) members  in 
period t. 
 
• Denote       the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital. We can 
show that:  
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Concluding Remarks 
• In the presence of information friction, both capital taxation 
and external financing worsen the incentive condition in the 
credit market, which in turn lead to more stringent contract 
enforcement/monitoring.  
 
• Since enforcement is costly, from both the growth- and 
welfare-maximizing perspectives, a more conservative tax on 
capital is called for to mitigate the distortions resulted from 
asymmetric information as well as from external financing.  
 
• Empirical implications: economies with more severe 
information frictions in the credit market and/or greater 
reliance on external financing should tax capital less and tax 
labor more. 
 
• Some quantitative exercise would be helpful… 
